An update as the investigating agency in the US (National Transportation Safety Board - NTSB) has released some details from the interviews of the train's engineer.
For the turn at mile post 19.8, he knew he had to slow from 80 down to 30mph. He saw the mile posts for 16 and 17 but doesn't recall seeing mile posts 18 or 19 nor the speed limit sign. The engineer had only driven this newly opened track once in that direction prior to this run. When he saw the 19.8 signage for the turn and speed he mistook the signage for something other than what it mean to his train. (
Seattle Times article)
The signs for mileposts are short and small - think the milepost markers on highways and the old stone markers by the track side. So they are not up at the cab's line of sight - the engineer has to be able to see them by the trackside. Google Streetview shows the markers for 19 and 18 clearly enough:
The milepost at 19 is quite visible but short (or at least it was in 2015 when this google streetview was created, I assume it was updated to the MP18 marker since 2015 when the track was renovated for this run):
https://www.google.com/maps/@47.0853244,-122.6563124,3a,43.1y,269.75h,88.11t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sTT3ZnPRjefg74n47-cMpDA!2e0!7i13312!8i6656

So is the milepost at 18, quite visible and tall enough (and this is from Aug 2017 streetview images):
https://www.google.com/maps/@47.0904183,-122.6371994,3a,86.3y,231.35h,74.11t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sDNI-siuk63OvyDBS9XTeNg!2e0!7i13312!8i6656

However, especially at the MP 18 sign, there are many tracks running past that milepost marker, and if the train was on one of the left tracks (ie not the right most track), seeing the sign might be a bit more difficult) and if a train was parked on the tracks between this train and the milepost, then it would have been totally obscured.
From my laypersons view, this accident was an inevitable consequence of several factors:
1) In the west of the US and most of it really, there is only diesel traffic, so there are no posts or overhead to attach signage to - this means signage will be driven into the ground where needed and thus be low to the ground, as almost all of the traffic is very slow freight traffic. For that type of traffic those signage rules work just fine, as they have since the 1960's. For 2018 with an 80mph train running through on of multiple tracks, spotting a small trackside low milepost that might be obscured is NOT a good system to rely on to start a braking maneuver.
2) The engineer had only one run in that direction on a brand new track run that was coming into service.
3) There is no other information the engineer has in the cab to indicate when and where braking has to happen, it seems. No route map with other landmarks to key off of, just the small milepost markers next to the tracks.
4) The track signage/design/layout/paperwork/operations view are all from a 30-40mph world of freight running, and not suited for higher speed 80mph traffic: that needs to be updated. The 19mp marker was from a 2015 photo, while the 18mp marker was from just this past 2017 summer, so the newer markers (MP18) are big and tall - but can be obscured on a multi-track layout.
My expectation of what will happen is that there needs to be tall-visible signs of braking points for speed limits put up at cab window level on all the tracks that such higher speed trains can come through on, and additional landmark data provided for the route paperwork so there is backup if the signs are damaged/obscured by standing trains.
The talk about the not yet operational electronic safety system is misplaced - yes it would have prevented the incident if it was operational but it should not have to be present if the engineer is awake and lucid - there is no reason the run cannot be safely done with visual cues and paperwork.
No new investigation results yet, just adding the Wikipedia article around the crash:
Edited by user 03 April 2018 18:12:32(UTC)
| Reason: Added link to wikipedia article about the crash